Armed Forces: Aviation

Liam Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many charter flights to theatres of operation have taken place in each year since 2003, broken down by  (a) location,  (b) type of aircraft and  (c) reason for flight.

Bob Ainsworth: Charter flights to theatres of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 are:
	
		
			  Op Telic IRAQ 
			   Type of Aircraft used  Flights 
			 2003 AN124,A330, B737, B747, B757, B767, DCIO, DC8, EL76, LI0-11, MD11 518 
			 2004 AN124,A330,B747, B757, DC8 89 
			 2005 AN124, A330, B747, DC8 25 
			 2006 A300, AN124, B747, B767, DC10, IL76 212 
			 2007 A300, A310, A330, AN124, B747, B767, DC10, IL76, B737, MD11 786 
			 2008 A300, DC8, AN124, B747, B767, DC10, IL76 737 
			 2009(1) A300, A310, AN124, B757, B767, DC8 186 
			 (1) 1 January to 30 April 
		
	
	
		
			  Op Herrick Afghanistan 
			   Type of Aircraft used  Flights 
			 2003 (1)— (1)— 
			 2004 (1)— (1)— 
			 2005 (1)— (1)— 
			 2006 A300, AN124, B737, B757, DC8, IL76 113 
			 2007 B737,A300,A310,A320, AN124, B757, B767, DC10, BL76 329 
			 2008(2) A300,A319,A321,A330, AN124, B737, B747, B757, B767, DC10,DC8,DL76 516 
			  A300, A321, A330, AN124, B737, B747, B757, B767, DC8, IL76 407 
			 (1) No charter recorded for Op Herrick (2) 1 January to 30 April 
		
	
	All flights are for the carriage of either passengers or freight or a combination of both.

Armed Forces: Manpower

Liam Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence 
	(1)  what percentage of force elements have reported  (a) no serious weaknesses,  (b) no critical weaknesses and  (c) no serious or critical weaknesses against required peacetime readiness levels in each of the last four quarters;
	(2)  what percentage of force elements have reported no serious or critical weaknesses against the ability to deploy, sustain and recover force elements at the most demanding level of the Defence Planning Assumptions for contingent operations in each of the last four quarters;
	(3)  what percentage of force elements have reported  (a) no serious weaknesses,  (b) no critical weaknesses and  (c) no serious or critical weaknesses against the ability to move from peacetime readiness to immediate readiness for deployment on operations in each of the last four quarters.

Bob Ainsworth: We have previously sought to measure our ability to bring force elements from their peacetime readiness levels up to the level required to deploy on potential contingent operations at the most demanding scale of effort, known as force generation, and to deploy them on such operations, sustain them there and recover them to their home base thereafter. This system has been predicated on the assumption that, for the most part, the armed forces will be operating below the concurrency level envisaged in defence planning assumptions and mat they should therefore be working to maintain their capacity to deploy on potential contingent operations. The longer we have been operating above that concurrency level, the more theoretical this has become. By definition we have consistently, over several years, been successfully generating, deploying, sustaining and recovering force elements above the long term concurrency levels assumed in our long term planning. The metrics we have been using to measure and report our hypothetical capability have consequently provided little or no meaningful management information. We are therefore working to develop a more useful way of measuring and reporting performance in this area for the time when the operational tempo has reduced and the forces structure is recuperated to the point where it is appropriate once more to seek to measure our contingent as opposed to our current capability.
	Statistical reporting against the graduated readiness profiles is published in the MOD public service agreement reports. The most recent report, setting out the Q3 2008-09 position, was published on the MOD website on 5 May 2009 and can be found at the following link:
	http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/FinancialReports/ModPublicService AgreementQuarterReportsapril2008ToMarch2011.htm
	The critical and serious weakness scores, as published, for each of the last four quarters are provided in the following table.
	
		
			  Percentage 
			   No serious weakness  No critical weakness  No serious or critical weakness 
			 Q4 2007-08 55 92 49 
			 Q1 2008-09 48 92 39 
			 Q2 2008-09 49 92 42 
			 Q3 2008-09 50 93 43